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1. Introduction
If U.S. major overseas military bases were to disappear, the United States could no longer
project military power abroad, and that would adversely affect America’s position as the world’s
most powerful country.1 To increase international political power and inﬂuence, some states
prefer to acquire nuclear weapons than to create a network of bases. However, international
interventions and wars are conducted with conventional weapons, and successful operations
require overseas bases. As such, worldwide military bases are essential for maintaining
America’s inﬂuence and primacy.2
Japan and Germany, as close allies of the United States, are more likely than non-allies to
provide stable U.S. military bases.3 In Germany, domestic pressure against U.S. bases is rare. In
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Japan and Germany, as close allies of the United States, are more likely than non-allies to
provide stable U.S. military bases. In Germany, domestic pressure against U.S. bases is rare
today. In Japan, however, local protest is strong. Why do these allies react differently to U.S.
military presence? How does the international security environment constrain domestic
reactions to U.S. presence? The answers to those questions have meaning for the prospects of
continued U.S. military presence. Recent literature on U.S. bases has focused on domestic
politics of host nations in explaining U.S. military presence. Generally, one would expect that
powerful domestic opposition could lead to U.S. troop withdrawal. Nonetheless, the international
environment continues to force Japan to rely on the United States. In the end, Japan’s security
dependence and America’s desire to remain in Japan play signiﬁcant roles for continued U.S.
presence and alliance. On the other hand, although local Germans and U.S. soldiers maintain
good relations and some towns work hard to retain U.S. bases, the United States continues to
reduce its military presence there. Taken together, international factors seem to exert more
influence on state decisions. In this article, I show the importance of linking base politics,
alliance politics, and the concept of alliance dilemma for better understanding base issues.
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１ The article is a signiﬁcant revision of the paper presented at the conference, Managing the Medusa
Project: U.S.-Japan Alliance Relations in Comparison with US-UK and US-Germany Ties, at Hokkaido
University, August 29-30, 2006. 
２ On primacy, see Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International
Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
３ In some rare cases, such as Cuba, non-allies provide military bases to the United States.
Okinawa, however, local protest is strong. Why do these allies react differently to U.S. military
presence? How does the international security environment constrain domestic reactions to U.S.
presence? The answers to those questions have meaning for the prospects of continued U.S.
military presence. In this article, I delineate domestic and international political factors affecting
the United States as the sending nation, and Japan and Germany as the major hosts.4
Despite political differences, neither Japan nor Germany has demanded that the United States
close its bases, but they have reacted differently to U.S. force realignment occurring in reaction
to a changing international security environment. A comparison of domestic politics shows
contrasts between the two countries. 
In Germany, local citizens favor U.S. presence, but the decline of the Soviet Union, a once-
formidable threat, has weakened the rationale for maintaining bases in Germany. The strong
domestic voice for retaining U.S. bases may have somewhat slowed U.S. withdrawal, but the
trend continues because of Europe’s benign security environment. On the other hand, citizens in
Okinawa, where U.S. bases are densely populated, largely oppose U.S. military presence.
However, overshadowing Japanese domestic opposition to the bases is East Asia’s unstable
international security environment causing Japan’s government to maintain the U.S.-Japan
alliance and the U.S. bases. Relevant to the case is the concept of alliance dilemma.5
The issue of military bases is closely linked to the study of international relations in general,
but few works have examined their relationship. Previous works include detailed accounts of
military bases such as the number of U.S. soldiers, tanks, ships, and airplanes stationed at a
particular base.6 Others have advanced political agenda calling for total withdrawal of U.S.
bases.7 In recent years, however, studies on U.S. military bases have changed noticeably. For
example, Kent Calder and Alexander Cooley have used political science approaches to the issue
of overseas military presence.8 Andrew Yeo has explored base protests in various countries as
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４ I chose these two countries because both are major allies of the United States as well as main host
countries to U.S. forces situated in different security environments.
５ Glenn Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 461-95.
６ Paolo E. Coletta, ed., United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas (Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 1985).
７ Hiromichi Umebayashi, Zainichi beigun [U.S. forces in Japan] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2002);
Umebayashi, Jyouhou koukai hou de toraeta zainichi beigun [Understanding U.S. forces in Japan
through U.S. Freedom of Information Act] (Tokyo: Koubunken, 1992); Umebayashi, Jyouhou koukai
hou de toraeta Okinawa no beigun [Understanding U.S. forces in Okinawa through U.S. Freedom of
Information Act] (Tokyo: Koubunken, 1994); and Joseph Gerson and Bruce Birchard, eds., The Sun
Never Sets…: Confronting the Network of Foreign U.S. Military Bases (Boston, MA: South End Press,
1991). Peace activists and scholars collaborate on some works. For example, Catherine Lutz, ed., The
Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts (London: Pluto Press, 2009). Lutz is a
professor of anthropology at Brown University. Several contributors to this volume are antiwar,
antimilitary activists.
８ Kent Calder, Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2007); and Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the
social movements.9 These trends are welcomed in the study of bases although the relative focus
is on the domestic side.
The study of alliance is also important because many U.S. overseas bases are located in the
territories of close allies such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea. The literature on alliances,
such as Stephen Walt’s The Origins of Alliances10 and Glenn Snyder’s Alliance Politics,11 focus on
alliance formation and politics among allies, but they discuss little about overseas military
bases. Moreover, regarding studies comparing Japanese and German security issues, Peter
Katzenstein12 and Thomas Berger13 have made outstanding contributions, but they have not
detailed the issue of military bases. My contribution in this article, hence, is to examine both
bases and alliances by looking at domestic and international political environments of Japan
and Germany. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. First, I discuss the background for force
realignment in Japan, focusing on the history of Okinawa’s anti-base movement since 1995.
Second, I examine America’s international and domestic environments by touching on
transformation and Global Posture Review (GPR). Third, I brieﬂy explain agreements between
Japan and the United States in the Force Realignment Plan. Fourth, I explore how Japan’s
international and domestic environments affected their reactions to force realignment. Fifth, I
examine the German case as a comparative study. Finally, I provide concluding remarks.
2. Background for Force Realignment in Japan: Protest Movement in Okinawa and SACO
U.S.-Japan alliance and base issues cannot be understood without analyzing Okinawa, which
constitutes about 0.6 percent of Japanese land14 but is host to about 74 percent of U.S. bases in
Japan.15 On May 15, 1972, the United States returned Okinawa to Japan, but Okinawa residents
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U.S. Military Overseas (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).
９ Andrew Yeo, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2011.
10 Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory is a representative work on alliances. See his The Origins of
Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
11 Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
12 Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in International Politics
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); and Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe
in the American Imperium (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005).
13 Thomas Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-Militarism,” International
Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 119–150; and Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in
Germany and Japan (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
14 “Todoufuken betsu menseki [Land area according to prefectures],” Heisei 24 nendo zenkoku todoufuken
shikuchouson menseki shirabe [2012 survey of land area of prefectures, cities, wards, towns, and villages],
Kokudo chiri in [Geospatial Information Authority of Japan], October 1, 2012, http://www.gsi.go.jp/
KOKUJYOHO/MENCHO/201210/ichiran.pdf (accessed June 24, 1013).
15 “Okinawa no beigun oyobi jieitai kichi (Toukei shiryou shu) [U.S. military bases and Self-Defense
Forces bases in Okinawa (Statistics)],” March 2012, Okinawa Prefecture, http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/
site/chijiko/kichitai/documents/h24toukei-2-1.pdf (accessed June 24, 2013).
continue to endure noise pollution and to fear that U.S. forces will cause accidents.
When three U.S. service men stationed in Okinawa raped a Japanese schoolgirl on September
4, 1995, Okinawans’ accumulated anger erupted. On October 21, dissatisfaction over the Status
of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that favorably treats suspects also provoked a massive protest.
According to the organizer, 85,000 protestors demonstrated in Naha, Okinawa’s capital.16 Ten
days later, on October 31, the United States and Japan formed the Special Action Committee on
Okinawa (SACO), a consultative group on base issues, which ﬁrst met on November 20 to
discuss how to deal with the growing anti-base movement. Five months later, on April 12, 1996,
Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and U.S. Ambassador to Japan Walter Mondale announced
that the Futenma Air Base, located in a crowded residential area in Okinawa, would be returned
to Japan within the next ﬁve to seven years. This agreement was included in the interim SACO
report that came out three days later.17
On April 17, Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton met in Santa Monica,
California, to announce a joint security declaration, emphasizing the importance of the alliance
between the two countries.18 However, on September 8, Okinawans showed their objections by
holding Japan’s ﬁrst prefectural referendum (59.53 percent voting rate) in which 89 percent
voted to downsize U.S. bases in Okinawa and to revise SOFA.19 The ﬁnal SACO report,
completed on December 2, 1996,20 conﬁrmed that Futenma Air Base would be returned within
ﬁve to seven years along with ten other facilities, amounting to about 21 percent (or 5,000
hectares) of the total U.S. bases in Okinawa. 
At that time, Japan and the United States were revamping their drifting alliance ties, and
were challenged to respond to the deteriorating East Asian security environment, including the
North Korean nuclear crises (1993–94) and the Taiwan Strait crisis (1996). The strong local
opposition to U.S. presence in Okinawa could have damaged the alliance, and both countries
sensed that they could not take that risk. However, despite the SACO agreement in 1996, almost
no progress occurred. Futenma Air Base was never moved to the proposed relocation site, the
shore of Henoko by Camp Schwab in Okinawa, because local activists stifﬂy resisted it and even
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16 Okinawa Times, Okinawa kara: Beigun kichi mondai dokyumento [From Okinawa: The document of
U.S. base problem] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1997), 55.
17 Ibid., 181. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee (SACO) Interim
Report, April 15, 1996, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/seco.html (accessed
December 1, 2012).
18 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century,”
April 17, 1996, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html (accessed December
1, 2012).
19 Okinawaken kobunshokan [Okinawa Prefectural Archives], Kobunshokan tsuushin, Anohino
Okinawa, 9 gatsu 8 ka kenmintouhyou (1996 nen) [Archives news, Okinawa on September 8, 1996,
prefectural referendum], http://www.archives.pref.okinawa.jp/publication/2012/09/post-81.html
(accessed April 30, 2013).
20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SACO Final Report, December 2, 1996, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-
america/us/security/96saco1.html (accessed December 1, 2012).
rejected the government’s environmental assessment, a prerequisite for the relocation. In 2003,
environmental activists ﬁled a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), further
delaying the plan. They argued that constructing the airbase would produce inﬁll that would
endanger the dugong, a sea cow. They demanded that DOD comply with the U.S. National
Historic Preservation Act.21
When DOD was negotiating the SACO deal, the United States began the transformation
process, to adjust U.S. forces in response to a new security environment. As part of
transformation, the Global Posture Review called for realigning U.S. bases overseas. Ultimately
the GPR involving Japan was quite similar to the SACO plan created about a decade earlier.
3. U.S. Security Policy: Transformation and Global Posture Review 
Transformation calls for running the U.S. military more effectively and efﬁciently in the post-
Cold War era and for emphasizing unpredictable threats such as terrorism, although traditional
state threats will continue to be important. Moreover, to adjust to a new security environment,
the Global Posture Review (GPR) seeks the realignment of U.S. military bases worldwide,
emphasizing overseas military bases.
Transformation began in 1996 by the DOD’s initiative to reexamine the post-Cold War
strategy and tactics of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines to explore how to run them more
efﬁciently. DOD’s Transformation Planning Guidance, deﬁnes transformation as “a process that
shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations
of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and
protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps
underpin peace and stability in the world.”22
The 2001 DOD Quadrennial Defense Review states that the U.S. national security goal is to
transform the military from a threat-based model dealing with Cold War threats to a
capabilities-based model dealing with twenty-ﬁrst century threats. The “capabilities-based
model focuses more on how an adversary might ﬁght.”23 Instead of focusing on “who the
adversary might be or where a war might occur,”24 the capabilities-based model focuses on
preparing for troubles that cannot be predicted. This approach seeks to improve ﬂexibility and
mobility to send U.S. forces to future unknown trouble spots swiftly.
Speaking to Congress on September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush said “[t]o contend
with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will
require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as
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21 Center for Biological Diversity, “Save the Okinawa Dugong,” http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/
species/mammals/Okinawa_dugong/ (accessed October 31, 2013).
22 U.S. Department of Defense, Transformation Planning Guidance (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2003), 3.
23 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001), iv.
24 Ibid.
temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces.”25
In August 2003, the United States announced the GPR calling for realigning U.S. forces
abroad to more effectively and efﬁciently confront new threats such as terrorism. On November
25, President Bush announced that the United States would review its relationships with its
allies around the globe: “Beginning today, the United States will intensify our consultations with
the Congress and our friends, allies, and partners overseas on our ongoing review of our
overseas force posture. We will ensure that we place the right capabilities in the most
appropriate locations to best address the new security environment.”26 On August 16, 2004, Bush
said “Over the next ten years, the president's plan will close hundreds of U.S. facilities overseas
and bring home about 60,000 to 70,000 uniformed personnel and approximately 100,000 family
members and civilian employees.”27
Moreover, the 2006 DOD Quadrennial Defense Review suggests that the United States has
been “adjusting the U.S. global military force posture, making long overdue adjustments to U.S.
basing by moving away from a static defense in obsolete Cold War garrisons, and placing
emphasis on the ability to surge quickly to trouble spots across the globe.”28 Such force
realignment is now underway in allies that provide U.S. bases.
In sum, with the end of the Cold War and especially after 9/11, the United States has
emphasized dealing with unpredictable threats such as terrorism relative to threats emanating
from traditional states. To meet new security challenges, the United States has reemphasized
the signiﬁcance of overseas bases and the need to realign overseas base structure accordingly.
4. The Force Realignment Plan and Japan
The force realignment plan unavoidably affected Japan, a provider of major U.S. bases. Japan
and the United States took three steps to reach a ﬁnal agreement and to establish the Roadmap
for Force Realignment Implementation.
4.1. Three Steps
In the ﬁrst stage, Japan and the United States agreed on common strategic objectives. In the
second stage, they delineated the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan’s Self Defense Forces
(SDF) and the U.S. Armed Forces. In the ﬁnal stage, they devised a roadmap for realignment
implementation.
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25 This speech was also included in The National Security Strategy of the United States of America
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 29.
26 Statement by President George W. Bush, November 25, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2003/11/20031125-11.html (accessed November 19, 2006).
27 The White House, Fact Sheet: Making America More Secure by Transforming Our Military,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040816-5.html (accessed November 19, 2006).
28 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: GPO, February,
2006), v.
First, on February 19, 2005, the Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee29
set common strategic goals at a regional level. The goals included peaceful uniﬁcation of the
two Koreas, peaceful resolution regarding North Korean nuclear programs, and resolution of the
Taiwan Strait issue. The four defense and state ministers of both countries, Secretary of State
Condoleeza Rice, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Minister for Foreign Affairs Nobutaka
Machimura, and Minister of State for Defense Yoshinori Ohno, also sought transparency for
China’s military. At a global level, both countries agreed to tackle terrorism and the spread of
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).
Second, on October 29, 2005, once again the ministers met to discuss the “U.S.-Japan Alliance:
Transformation and Realignment for the Future,”30 outlining the roles, missions, and capabilities
of SDF and of the U.S. forces, as well as force posture realignment. Both countries reconﬁrmed
that “[t]he U.S. will maintain forward-deployed forces, and augment them as needed, for the
defense of Japan as well as to deter and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan.”31
Regarding nuclear deterrence: “U.S. strike capabilities and the nuclear deterrence provided by
the U.S. remain an essential complement to Japan's defense capabilities in ensuring the defense
of Japan and contribute to peace and security in the region.”32 Moreover, the document discussed
transforming the SDF, enabling it to act jointly with the American military by strengthening
joint operational coordination. Their recommendations for realigning U.S. forces stationed in
Japan became the foundation of the next document. 
Third, “The Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (May 1, 2006)33 included the ﬁnalized
content. Following the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting, the four
ministers (Rice and Rumsﬁeld were involved, but Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Aso and
Minister of State for Defense Fukushiro Nukaga replaced Machimura and Ohno) released a joint
statement34 in which both nations agreed to continue the alliance to deal with future threats, and
to adjust the alliance to meet demands from the changing security environment. Touching on
the issue of realigning U.S. forces, the document stressed that “these realignment initiatives are
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29 “Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee ,” February 19, 2005,
ﬁle://G:\www_bk\j\news\youjin\2005\02\0219_2plus2\04.htm (accessed January 24, 2006).
30 Security Consultative Committee, “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future,”
http://www.jda.go.jp/j/news/youjin/2005/10/1029_2plus2/29_e.htm (accessed January 20, 2006).
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” issued following May 1, 2006
Meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee involving Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Aso, and
Japanese Minister of State for Defense Fukushiro Nukaga, May 1, 2006,” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2006/65517.htm (accessed May 2, 2006).
34 Joint Statement by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Aso, and Japanese Minister of State for Defense Fukushiro
Nukaga, May 1, 2006, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/65523.htm (accessed May 2, 2006).
essential to strengthen the foundation of alliance transformation.” The term all iance
transformation was new. On the day the meeting was held, Defense Minister Fukushiro Nukaga
said that the alliance seemed to be reaching a new height.35 Obviously both countries desired not
only further cooperation but also changes in the alliance: the United States would no longer
protect Japan in return for Japan providing the bases; instead, Japan would cooperate on
military missions. The roadmap was considered important because it affects where U.S. forces
will be deployed and strengthens U.S.-Japanese security ties, especially when some SDFs and
U.S. headquarters will be co-located at the same base in Japan.
4.2. The Roadmap for Force Realignment Implementation
The roadmap deals with six issues: (1) realignment in Okinawa, (2) improvement of U.S.
Army command and control capability, (3) Yokota Air Base and Air Space, (4) relocation of
Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni, (5)
missile defense, and (6) training relocation. The ﬁrst two are especially important.
The ﬁrst core component in the agreement is base realignment in Okinawa, speciﬁcally,
where to relocate Futenma. The Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), to be completed by 2014,
is conﬁgured basically as landﬁll and includes “two runways aligned in a ‘V’-shape, each
runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each
runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls.”36 Unless FRF is completely
operational, the United States does not plan to relocate forces there nor will it operate ﬁghter
aircraft from there. Hence, before MCAS Futenma is returned to Japan, the United States will
examine bases used by the Air Self Defense Forces at Nyutabaru City (Miyazaki Prefecture) and
Tsuiki City (Fukuoka Prefecture). If needed, facilities may be improved, but the roadmap does
not clarify which country will bear the costs. 
The relocation plan, scheduled for completion by 2014, calls for relocating from Okinawa
Prefecture to Guam about 8,000 Marine personnel (III Marine Expeditionary Force, or IIIMEF)
and about 9,000 dependents. Units not directly engaged in combat will be relocated: Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) Command Element, Third Marine Division headquarters, Third
Marine Logistics Groups-formerly Force Service Support Group headquarters, First Marine Air
Wing headquarters, and Twelfth Marine Regiment headquarters. U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) air-
ground task force elements, including “command, ground, aviation, and combat service
support” and “a base support capability” will remain to ensure deterrence. This relocation plan
affects units mainly from Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and
Makiminato Service Area. Relocation costs are estimated at $10.27 billion. Japan has agreed to
cover 59 percent ($6.89 billion with $2.8 billion in direct cash), and the United States, 31 percent
($3.18 billion).
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35 “Nihon no se ni omoi yakusoku [Japan shoulders a heavy promise],” Asahi Shimbun, May 2, 2006, 5.
36 “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation.”
The second important agreement is about Army command and control structure. By U.S.
ﬁscal year 2008, the United States would transform the structure of Camp Zama’s Army
command and control, integrating command functions for U.S. Army’s First Corps at Fort Lewis
in Washington State with Camp Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture. Furthermore, by Japan ﬁscal
year 2012, Ground SDF Central Readiness Force headquarters is to be co-located at Zama, and
SDF helicopters could use Camp Zama’s Kastner heliport. Using U.S. funds, the United States
would construct a battle command training center and various support facilities inside the
Sagami General Depot (SGT).
Thus the United States and Japan took three steps between 2005 and 2006 before they agreed
to the base realignment plan. With this background for force realignment, Japan faces dilemmas
in dealing with the plan. Overall, the Japanese people are most pleased that citizens living close
to U.S. bases in Okinawa will have their burden lifted. The Japanese government also wants to
alleviate those burdens, but it is more concerned about maintaining deterrence.
5. Japan’s Reactions to the U.S. Force Realignment Plan
Local opposition has been generally strong against U.S. bases, but not strong enough for the
Japanese government to consider requesting the withdrawal of U.S. soldiers because U.S.
military presence is essential for countering potential threats in East Asia. Moreover, providing
the United States with military bases in Japan is a key component of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As
such, Japan is reluctant to jeopardize the alliance. The alliance dilemma affected Japan’s
reactions to force realignment.
5.1. Domestic Reactions to the U.S. Force Realignment Plan
Continuing to maintain Futenma Base in a densely populated area is problematic.37 If another
serious incident occurs, it will arouse stronger anti-base and anti-U.S. protests across Okinawa,
which would not only threaten U.S. military presence in Okinawa but also the U.S.-Japan
alliance itself. Removing Futenma from the center of the city to a less densely populated area
would reduce the chances of accidents, but strong resistance at candidate sites has made
relocation difﬁcult.
In 2004, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi announced that local governments in mainland
Japan would share Okinawa’s burden.38 Camp Fuji (Gotemba City, Shizuoka Prefecture) was a
candidate, but in July the mayor rejected requests by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
and Japan Defense Agency (JDA).39 Henoko in Nago City in Okinawa Prefecture has been
another proposed relocation site since the mid-1990s, but again strong protests interfere.
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37 For negotiations regarding Futenma relocation, see Takemasa Moriya, “Futenma” koushou hiroku
[The secret negation of Futenma] (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2010).
38 “Shushou hondo iten wo meigen [Prime minister clearly states that relocation would take place in the
mainland],” Asahi Shimbun, October 2, 2004, 1.
39 “Kichino jimoto hamon hirogaru [Worries spread in base towns],” Asahi Shimbun, October 2, 2004, 38.
Similarly, in the relocation plan involving other bases in mainland Japan, 90 percent of citizens
in Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture, have opposed the relocation of ﬁghter jets from Atsugi
City, Kanagawa Prefecture.40
Under the new and ﬁrst Democratic government, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama (September
2009–June 2010) heightened Okinawans’ hopes during the election campaign by discussing
moving Futenma Base. After he became Prime Minister, he negotiated with the island of
Tokunoshima, Kagoshima Prefecture, to no avail. He claimed to have another plan but never
revealed it. Moreover, his attempt to reconsider a previously arranged plan raised U.S. concerns
and damaged the bilateral relationship. In the end, he could not ﬁnd a relocation site. Taking
responsibility for the debacle, he resigned. 
The new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, an ardent supporter of the U.S.-Japan alliance, began a
new administration in December 2012, and tried to hasten the relocation plan by increasing the
Okinawa Promotion Funds41 linked with the return of ﬁve U.S. bases located in southern
Okinawa Prefecture.42 The previous Democratic government delinked the Futenma relocation
and the return of the ﬁve bases to soften criticisms against the Democrats, but Abe’s Liberal
Democratic Party re-sent the message to Okinawa Prefecture that Futenma must be relocated or
the other bases would not be returned, thereby pressuring Okinawa Prefecture to act on the
Futenma relocation plan. Abe has been more forceful in implementing the agreement, but the
prospect for successful relocation is uncertain. All in all, strong protests both within and outside
Okinawa have failed to close U.S. bases in Okinawa. The international environment, particularly
the issue of alliance, affects the case.
5.2. International Environment Affecting the Alliance and Base Issues in Japan
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S.-Japan alliance drifted apart for a short time
after the Cold War, but uncertainties in the security environment in East Asia brought them
back together. The alliance dilemma incentivized Japan to maintain its alliance with the United
States as well as U.S. bases in its territory. While some Japanese ofﬁcials feared that the United
States would drag them into U.S.-initiated wars in areas outside East Asia, concerns about
North Korean nuclear weapons and the rise of China persuade Japanese policymakers to remain
close with the United States. Alliance dilemma and the likelihood of U.S. abandonment affect
Japan’s calculation regarding base issues and alliances in general.
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300.1 billion yen],” Nippon Keizai Shimbun, January 30, 2013, http://www.nikkei.com/article/
DGXNZO51136280Z20C13A1LX0000/ (accessed April 1, 2013).
42 “Okinawa beigunkichi Kadena inan henkan ‘Futenma kirihanashi’ o tekkai [Okinawa U.S. bases south
of Kadena to be returned],” March 31, 2013, Mainichi Shimbun, http://mainichi.jp/select/news/
20130331k0000m010076000c.html (accessed April 5, 2013).
Glenn Snyder devised the alliance dilemma concept:43 when a state decides to cooperate with
its allies, it increases its risks of being entrapped in unwanted conﬂicts. If the state decides not
to cooperate, it increases its risks of being abandoned. In a multipolar system of many great
powers, alignment patterns are more ﬂuid; thus fears of abandonment and entrapment both
heighten the dilemma. During much of the bipolar Cold War, a U.S. alliance was considered
Japan’s best option. At the same time, relying on the United States under bipolarity security
meant a dominant fear of entrapment. The fear of abandonment, however, was still present.
With the d?tente between the United States and the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s, Japan saw
the possibility of abandonment.44
Has the balance between the two risks changed with the end of the Cold War? Stephen Walt’s
balance of threat theory suggests that an alliance without a common threat loses rationale for
its existence.45 The end of a bipolar system, therefore, should relax U.S.-Japan ties. The U.S.-
Japan Alliance, according to Yoichi Funabashi, was “drifting apart” in the immediate years after
the Cold War.46 Such a situation should generate fears of both entrapment and abandonment.
But the Japanese feared abandonment relatively more strongly because that fear had been
relatively weak for about 40 years.
The time for drifting apart was short, however. The alliance began to tighten after the 1993–
94 North Korean nuclear crises and the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, which showed that East
Asian states are relatively freer to act now that the superpowers imposed weaker structural
constraints on them after the Cold War. With the security environment directly threatening
Japan, it is drawn to cooperate closely with the United States. In the 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint
Declaration on Security, Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton agreed that the two
countries would start revising the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation of 1978.47
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Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1995), 3.
45 Walt, The Origins of Alliances.
46 Yoichi Funabashi, Doumei houryuu [Alliance adrift] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997).
47 Masahiro Akiyama, Nichibei no senryaku taiwaga hajimatta: Anpo saiteigi no butaiura [The Japan-
U.S. strategic dialogue has begun] (Tokyo: Aki Shobo, 2002), pp. 241–243. Many presume it was not
just the 1993 North Korean crisis but also the Taiwan Strait Crisis of March 1996 that gave Japan and
the United States an incentive to work closely. While he does not deny that, Akiyama argues that after
1993 North Korean crisis, Japan has already been working on how to cooperate more smoothly and
Japan hopes to see bilateral cooperation mainly in East Asia, while the United States expects
it on a global level. America’s preference seems to have won over that of Japan’s. For example,
one force realignment plan included moving army command from Washington State to Camp
Zama. The Washington command oversees operations from Singapore to the Indian Ocean.
Article 6 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, however, stipulates that the United States can
use bases/facilities in Japan to contribute to Japan’s security as well as to peace and security of
the Far East. Japan is concerned that it would be supporting wars in areas beyond the Far East
if integrations between U.S. forces and Japanese SDF proceed further, as stated in the October
2005 2 Plus 2 (or Security Consultative Committee) document. 
In August 2004, with approval of Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda, Minister of
Defense Shigeru Ishiba, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) secretly drafted a letter to the
United States objecting to co-location of the U.S. Army Corps I in Camp Zama because it would
stretch SDF activities to the Middle East, and thus violate the “Far East” clause.48 Moreover, on
August 27, 2004, Shin Ebihara, MOFA Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau
and Kazuki Iihara, JDA Director-General of the Defense Policy Bureau, met with Richard
Armitage, then Deputy Secretary of State at the State Department, and reiterated the difﬁculties
of accepting a new command to Zama.49 MOFA’s Treaties Bureau (currently the International
Legal Affairs Bureau) has particularly advocated adhering strictly to the article. 
Japan’s SDF, however, has already supported U.S. wars afar. Japan quickly passed two laws
speciﬁcally to back U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.50 Although Japan was not engaged in
combat missions, by sending troops to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, they may already have been
entrapped into U.S. wars. It also means that the SDF have expanded their geographical
responsibilities outside the Far East. Practically, SDF has already violated both the letters and
spirit of Article 6.
Such developments are because Japan’s fear of abandonment outweighs the fear of
entrapment. The East Asian security environment is ﬂuid, and Japan needs U.S. bases as well as
continued U.S. alliance to counter future contingencies. As such, Japan cannot reject U.S.
demands to bring the command from Washington, although it entails future activities beyond
the Far East. Moreover, Japan agreed to shoulder 60 percent of costs to relocate U.S. Marines in
Okinawa to Guam, but this too seems to be from the fear of abandonment. 
In sum, at the top level, Japan does not consider it rational to demand U.S. troop withdrawal,
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as strategic calculations shape force deployment plans. Although former Prime Minister
Hatoyama took a unique stance on Okinawan bases, even he did not call for withdrawal of
major American bases in Okinawa or for ending the alliance. He said, “Deterrence including
nuclear deterrence as well as Japan-U.S. Security Treaty are needed in the Asia-Paciﬁc region.”51
In fact, no serious politicians, Democrats or Liberal Democrats, have opposed the U.S.-Japan
alliance or questioned the signiﬁcance of Okinawan bases. Japan’s fear of abandonment by the
United States in case of contingencies led Japan to concede to U.S. demands such as partial
integration of command. The fear also contained local protests in Okinawa.
6. Germany Compared
In stark contrast with Japan where many Okinawans longed for U.S. troop withdrawal, and
where potential sites resisted base relocations, Germans were reluctant to lose U.S. forces. Why
did the Japanese and Germans react to force realignment so differently? Moreover, although
German local governments tried strongly, why did they fail to stall U.S. force reduction? 
6.1. The Force Realignment Plan and Germany
On March 25, 2004, the Washington Post reported that the DOD had drafted plans to
withdraw U.S. forces from countries such as Germany by as much as 50 percent of the 71,000
stationed there. Commenting on the Army, one ofﬁcial said the United States would withdraw
“more than 60 percent of its 56,000 (Army) troops in Germany.”52
Although ofﬁcials declined to comment, top U.S. ofﬁcials met on May 20, 2004 to discuss the
Pentagon plan.53 According to U.S. Army Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker, the United States was
planning to withdraw two heavy divisions from Germany: First Armored Division and First
Infantry Division, located in Bavaria, Hesse, and Rhineland-Palatinate, constituting more than
half of those stationed in Germany, many of whom served in Iraq. Once the divisions return to
the United States, they may be replaced by the Stryker division, which is much smaller but
more lightly armored and mobile than traditional divisions.54 If the plans are implemented,
about 40,000 troops will remain in Germany.
President Bush spoke about the GPR on August 16, 2004. Regarding the expected changes in
Europe, he emphasized that infrastructures built during the Cold War were no longer relevant
and should be eliminated. Heavy forces used for land warfare would no longer be needed and
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would return to the United States. He reiterated that heavy divisions in Germany would be
replaced with rapidly deployable forces.55 In late July 2005, the DOD announced that 11 bases
would be returned to Germany in ﬁscal 2007: “scheduled as part of plans for the 1st Infantry
Division headquarters’ return to the United States with its divisional ﬂag in the summer of
2006. Additionally, the 1st Infantry Division’s subordinate units, as well as selected V Corps and
U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) units will return to the United States, inactivate entirely,
convert, or be reassigned in Europe to support Army transformation in ﬁscal 2006.”56
6.2. Germany’s Domestic Reactions to U.S. Force Withdrawal
In February 2003, to persuade the United Nations to pass a resolution that would increase the
legitimacy for the United States to invade Iraq, Secretary of State Collin Powell insisted that
Iraq was clandestinely developing WMDs and refusing to cooperate with inspectors. However,
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder opposed the resolution mainly for domestic political
reasons. German, French, and Russian opposition killed the resolution, souring U.S. relations
particularly with France and Germany. The United States threatened to withdraw U.S. troops
from Germany and cancel commercial contracts, but for economic and social reasons, ofﬁcials
and citizens in German local governments where U.S. bases are located tried to halt U.S. force
withdrawals.
U.S. ofﬁcials, especially at the DOD, were furious at the Germans and wanted to damage
economic relations by terminating military and industrial cooperation. Department hawks tried
to make Germany an example to show what would happen to a country for defying the United
States. According to one Pentagon source, “The aim is to hit German trade and commerce. It is
not just about taking out the troops and equipment; it is also about cancelling commercial
contract and defense-related arrangements.”57 Industries in Germany support the U.S. Army in
Europe by providing missiles and equipment. Defense companies such as Diehl, a missile
maker; EADS Deutschland, aerospace and defense giant; Rheinmetall, armaments maker; and
Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, a vehicle maker, earn billions of euros every year, and they are most
likely to lose from U.S. withdrawal.58
Small towns in Germany where U.S. forces are stationed also feared that U.S. withdrawal
would damage the local economy.59 The U.S. Army’s First Infantry Division’s home is in the
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southern city of Wuerzburg. A spokesman there worries about base closure, because thousands
of local jobs depend on U.S. forces.60 The Kaiserlautern Military Community (KMC) will also
likely be affected because it has more than 20,000 Army and Air Force troops, civilians, and
retirees, and the same number of U.S. dependents. According to the annual report of the 435th
Comptroller Squadron at Ramstein Air Base, in 2003 KMC brought about $1.29 billion to the
local economy.61 About 20 percent of Birkenfeld district’s GDP depends on the Baumholder
military base, where parts of the First Infantry Division are currently stationed. Werner Knauth,
press spokesman for the district, is greatly concerned about repercussions from base closings.
German ofﬁcials have tried to convince the Americans to remain in Germany. Eric Schaefer,
press spokesman for the Interior Ministry of Rhineland-Palatinate, said, “We’re now in
negotiations with the Americans, trying to make it appealing for them to stay at their current
sites.”62 Mayors in German towns where U.S. troops are stationed have also tried to halt further
withdrawal with a strategy I call bond appealing. Thirteen mayors from Germany visited
Washington: “They met with several members of Congress, including House Speaker Dennis
Hastert, R-Ill., and a team from the Pentagon, including Air Force Gen. Richard Myers, chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Secretary of the Air Force James Roche and acting Secretary of the
Amy Les Brownlee.” The mayors “praised U.S. service members and their families for being
wonderful guests,” and argued that Germany already has the necessary infrastructure, and that
they can “guarantee a good future for troops.”63
Differences between Japan and Germany can also be found in the good relationships between
U.S. soldiers and German locals. Consider an article excerpt:
American GIs walk the streets, eat at local restaurants, and marry Baumholder’s
daughters. Female soldiers and the wives of GIs have their hair done at the local beauty
parlor, and their children play on local soccer teams. Sigrid Zimmer, proprietor of the
Berghof Hotel, has often taken an active role supporting US troops in Baumholder. When
the soldiers from the base shipped off to Iraq last year, she organized a drive to send care
packages. “When they left for Iraq it was just terrible,” she says. “Those are our boys, too.
It just won’t be the same without them.” Zimmer pulls out a handful of thank-you letters
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that soldiers wrote from Iraq. She is particularly fond of a letter from Pfc. Roy Scranton,
who wrote: “It is the thought of such kind and openhearted people back home that makes
our hard work here worthwhile and carries us through out daily struggle.” “When he
referred to Baumholder as home, I just cried my heart out,” she says.64
An excerpt from another article stands in stark contrast with the Okinawan situation:
No one is afraid of the Americans, who, with 13,000 people, make up the town’s majority—
the base has the largest concentration of combat arms soldiers outside the mainland United
States. Instead, most of Baumholder’s 5,000 German residents are willing to show some
leniency toward the young troops. Friendships have developed over the years and the
Germans worried along with American families about the spouses, parents and friends in
Iraq. Before that, it was Kuwait. Before that, Vietnam.65
Furthermore, in Schweinfurt, Bavaria, more than 10 percent of the 300 marriages were between
Germans and Americans in 2003. The relationships between the base and town were “at times,
even a love affair.”66 However, strong appeal from local governments and citizens could not stop
U.S. force withdrawal from Germany.
6.3. International Environment Affecting U.S. Force Withdrawal from Germany
Compared with East Asia, Europe’s security environment is quite stable. Even if the United
States had not “punished” Germany by threatening to reduce U.S. forces, the United States
nonetheless continued to reduce troops simply because no serious threat looms. Neither the fear
of entrapment nor abandonment is in force. Thus, no matter how Germans long for continued
U.S. military presence for economic and other reasons, American soldiers will likely continue
leaving Germany. 
As explained before, after Germany opposed the Iraq War, the United States announced plans
to withdraw troops from Germany. Fearing more opposition from allies, the United States was
apparently signaling consequences they might suffer if they deﬁed U.S. leadership: “Last month
[February 2003], German Defense Minister Peter Stuck said he was told the United States had
no plans to reduce its troops in Germany, but White House spokesman Ari Fleischer hinted
several days later that the United States was mulling over plans to restructure its overseas
troops.”67 Moreover, “the German military attaché here, Col. Carsten Jacobson, expressed
surprise when told the force reduction could end up in the range of 50 percent. ‘It’s deﬁnitely
higher than what we’ve heard so far,’ he said, adding that his understanding was the proposed
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cuts were in the rage of 20 to 30 percent.”68
On February 11, 2003, Duncan Hunter, Republican Chairman of the House Armed Service
Committee, announced hearings concerning U.S forces in Europe, primarily focused on
Germany. He emphasized that the planned hearings were not intended to punish Germany for
opposing America’s plans to attack Iraq, but “Germany’s and France’s opposition of the use of
military force to oust Saddam Hussein has ‘brought the issue to the forefront.’” He also
mentioned that withdrawing troops was not just about bringing troops and families back home,
but also about “creating bases in ‘more cost-friendly environments’ in some of the Eastern
European nations that have recently joined or been invited to join NATO.”69
With the end of the Cold War, the United States has been adjusting its force structure
overseas to reﬂect the needs of the changing security environment. As such, Germany’s
opposition to the Iraq War per se was probably not the primary reason for withdrawing U.S.
troops. Douglas J. Feith, Pentagon undersecretary for policy, said “the changes in troop levels
were in no way connected to Germany’s opposition to the U.S.-led war in Iraq.”70 While he may
have been speaking diplomatically, the remarks have some truth. When the Cold War ended,
more than 300,000 U.S. troops were in Europe; in the late 1990s, 244,200 were in Germany.71 By
2004, U.S. forces in Europe were cut by one third to 114,000.72 In December 2012, according to
DOD, the number was down to 45,596.73 This suggests that domestic demand for continued U.S.
presence, no matter how strong, did not stall further reduction of U.S. soldiers in Germany.
Rather, changes in the international security environment seem to account for the trend.
7. Conclusion
In this article, I have shown ﬁrst that international structural change after the Cold War
induced the United States to reconsider its strategy from focusing on Soviet Union containment
to focusing on terrorism and the rise of China. With this change, the United States has begun
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realigning U.S. forces stationed overseas. I examined domestic reactions to U.S. force
realignment in two host countries, Japan and Germany, as well as the international security
environment and alliance relations.
Strong anti-base movements occur particularly in Okinawa, but the security environment
forces Japan to need U.S. bases and to continue the U.S.-Japan alliance. The Japanese
government’s stance on force realignment is to reduce the burden in Okinawa, but not to
sacriﬁce the level of deterrence.74 Despite local opposition to U.S. bases, top Japanese politicians
recognize that U.S. military presence is still crucial for Japan’s security and for maintaining the
U.S.-Japan alliance. As such, the fear of being abandoned by the United States in case of
contingencies constrains the domestic voice.
Germany’s opposition to the Iraq War in 2003 alarmed Washington policymakers, and some
called for punishing Germany by cutting defense-related business opportunities and reducing
U.S. troops more than initially planned. In response, mayors of some German cities even
travelled to Washington to lobby for continued U.S. presence. German reactions to U.S.
“punishment” showed how much those municipalities want to keep U.S. soldiers. However,
Europe lacks immediate threat, and America’s strategic shift from Europe to Asia seems to be
more fundamental in limiting domestic demands.
Recent literature on U.S. bases has focused on domestic politics of host nations in explaining
the prospects for U.S. presence. Generally, one would expect that powerful domestic opposition
could lead to U.S. troop withdrawal. Nonetheless, as discussed, the international environment
continues to force Japan to rely on the United States. In the end, Japan’s security dependence
and America’s desire to remain in Japan play signiﬁcant roles for continued U.S. presence and
alliance. Although local Germans and U.S. soldiers maintain good relations and some towns
work hard to retain U.S. bases, the United States continues to reduce its military presence there.
Taken together, international factors seem to exert more inﬂuence on state decisions. In this
article, I showed the importance of linking base politics, alliance politics, and the concept of
alliance dilemma for better understanding base issues.
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